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 Unilateral tariff cuts: a theory 
1. Introduction 
Trade liberalization in countries worldwide is provided in the form of gradual 
abolition of tariff and non-tariff barriers in foreign trade. Nowadays the developed 
countries often grant unilateral tariff preferences to the developing and transition 
economies in order to promote their exports and their industrialization (by diversify-
ing their export structure), and also to accelerate their economic growth. This is in-
tended to attract more investment, create more jobs etc. in order to achieve a sustain-
able development. It is based on the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereafter GATT) and its successor, the World 
Trade Organization (hereafter WTO). 
Now Ukrainian government set a course for Ukraine’s joining to European Un-
ion (hereafter EU); notably, it elaborated the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda to pre-
pare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement for 2014-2017, 
main directions of sectoral coordination are agreed, new conditions of Ukraine-EU 
commodity trade are defined, particularly the unilateral reduction or elimination of 
the EU customs duties for commodities originating in Ukraine in the framework of 
Autonomous Preferential Trade Regime (hereafter APTR). At the moment Ukraine 
also enjoys Generalized System of Preferences (hereafter GSP), granted by EU, for 
all products covered by the system except railway and tramway vehicles and products 
According to the trade theory the reduction of a tariff ceteris paribus leads to the 
increase of commodity flows. Taking into account that now raw materials and inter-
mediate products consist a large part of Ukrainian export to the EU, the reduction or 
elimination of import tariffs could lead to the increase of their exports, therefore fa-
voring to recognizing Ukraine as net exporter of raw materials and semi-finished 
goods. This is the case firstly for agricultural goods (which, however, are regulated 
by EU by non-tariff measures, notably, quotas), and also for output of mining and 
processing industries and metallurgy. Notably, a considerable part of Ukrainian met-
allurgical export to the EU, consists of raw materials and unfinished goods, which are 
processed later on European plants in order to create high value added production. 
But in current economic environment government’s behavior should be focused on 
departure from the image of raw materials exporting country since such economic 
policy is no longer effective.  
But in real economic conditions when commodity flows are influenced along 
with tariff by other factors, tariffs (as distorting element) could not be the main rea-
son of changes of commodity flows. In this context tariffs could be eliminated in or-
der to reduce their distorting effects in international trade. 
So, the main purpose of this paper is to analyze the APTR, granted by EU to 
Ukraine, in the context of modern theory of non-reciprocal trade agreements. To do 
 this we structured paper as follows. Section 2 reviews theoretical and empirical re-
search on the non-reciprocal trade liberalization. Section 3 provides brief examination 
of some theoretical approaches and practical implications of GSP arrangements in the 
world. Section 4 analyses current situation with tariff regulation in Ukraine-EU 
commodity trade. Finally, Section 5 presents some concluding remarks. 
2. Literature review 
The largest part of research studies the impact of trade freedom on economic 
growth (e.g., Krueger, Rivera & Romer, Akin et al. etc.). These papers usually use a 
panel data in order to investigate such impact. They concluded that trade freedom is 
highly significant and is positively related to economic growth. 
Onguglo analyzed the relevance of GPS schemes for developing countries in the 
1990's. He concluded that the existing trade preferences should be maintained, im-
proved and effectively utilized and should be combined with other policy measures in 
order to improve the productivity, quality of products, and horizontal and vertical di-
versification in exports. Herz & Wagner analyzed the efficiency of GSP. They con-
cluded that the GATT/WTO approach is a much better way to foster exports of low-
income countries. 
Another set of papers studies impact of non-reciprocal tariff arrangements on 
concrete regions, countries and industries (e.g. Candau & Jean, Low et al., Jones et al. 
etc.). 
The investigations providing quantitative evaluation of consequences of granting 
of tariff preferences, using statistical and econometric analysis, deserve a special 
mention.  
Ozden and Reinhardt developed and tested theoretical model of a small coun-
try’s trade policy choice, using a dataset of 154 developing countries for 1976-2000. 
They find that countries removed from the GSP adopt more liberal trade policies than 
those remaining eligible. Thus, their results suggest that developing countries may be 
best served by full integration into the reciprocity-based world trade regime rather 
than continued GSP schemes.  
Following their analysis, Grossman & Sykes considered the law and economics 
of discrimination within GSP schemes for developing countries. They concluded that 
the case against discriminatory preferences is at best an uneasy one, both in legal and 
in economic terms. Moreover, the ostensible justification for GSP schemes– to pro-
mote growth and development – is unlikely to be served well by existing GSP policy. 
François et al. examined the scope for preference erosion, using an econometric 
analysis, and modeling full elimination of OECD tariffs. They conclude that tariff 
preferences are underutilized due to administrative burden. And for those products 
where preferences are used, the primary negative impact follows from erosion of EU 
preferences. Gamberoni analyzed the impact of the EU unilateral trade preferences on 
 both the intensive and the extensive margin of trade. She found that the impact of 
non-reciprocal trade preferences on both margins is linked to the sector under analy-
sis and to the type of preferences a country benefits from. Also she confirmed that the 
GSP schemes for least developing countries did not change their export pattern, while 
the traditional GSP and the regime to combat drug production tend to promote export 
diversification.  
Hoekman et al. analyzed potential losses of erosion of tariff preferences. They 
concluded that such preferences are being eroded by liberalization at all levels, but at 
the same time the Doha Round is likely to lead to relatively limited preference ero-
sion. Consequently, a re-orientation of trade policies away from procedures that tend 
to hollow out the multilateral trade system would enhance the global welfare [10]. 
Fugazza & Nicita investigated to what extent preferential market access affects bilat-
eral trade, using an appropriate gravity model for two indices of market access condi-
tions which take into account the structure of tariff preferences and reflect both direct 
and indirect market conditions. Their results indicated that both of these two market 
access conditions affect bilateral trade. 
Laird analyzed the implementation of GSP schemes of seven major markets 
(Canada, China, European Union, India, Korea, Japan, and the United States) and 
simulated the impact on LDCs’ exports of extending full duty-free and quota-free 
market access. He concluded that the Doha Round might not have a significant im-
pact on LDCs’ trade, but, however, a possible Doha Round scenario combined with 
duty-free and quota-free market access could bring significant benefits to these coun-
tries [15]. Snyder analyzed nonreciprocal preference programs (upon the examples of 
the EU and U.S.). He concluded that preference-granting countries could improve the 
effectiveness of their programs through increasing the stability of preference pro-
grams, developing more defined eligibility criteria, expanding product coverage, and 
making rules of origin simpler and more flexible. Ketterer et al. using detailed prod-
uct-level tariff and trade data, analyzed Japanese external tariff adjustments in the 
presence of trade preferences. As a result they suggested that trade preferences may 
have hindered further Japanese external tariff liberalization during the last successful-
ly concluded multilateral trade round. 
The mentioned research does not consider the non-reciprocal tariff preferences, 
which now Ukraine enjoys in the trade with EU, so it makes sense to analyze them in 
the context of modern theory of non-reciprocal trade arrangements. 
3. Theoretical background 
Let’s briefly examine some theoretical approaches and practical implications of 
GSP arrangements in the world. 
Firstly the program concept was adopted internationally in 1968 by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) at the UNCTAD II Con-
 ference, which recommended the creation of a Generalized System of Preferences 
under which industrialized countries would grant trade preferences to all developing 
countries.  
According to the UNCTAD resolution, the objectives of the GSP system for de-
veloping countries should concentrate in promoting both of their exports and their in-
dustrialization, and also to accelerate their rates of economic growth. 
Two types of trade agreements should be distinguished: reciprocal (contractual) 
preferential trade agreement such as European Free Trade association (EFTA), and 
autonomous (unilateral, non-reciprocal) preferential trade agreements such as GSP.  
Under GSP schemes, selected products originating in developing countries, are 
granted reduced or zero tariff rates. At the same time, the least developed countries 
(LDCs) receive special and preferential treatment for a wider coverage of products 
and deeper tariff cuts. 
According Borrmann et al. the developing countries hoped the introduction of 
GSP schemes would both increase their earnings from exports of semi-finished and 
finished products and widen the domestic market by creation of additional foreign 
demand and by providing incentives in order to extent export capacities.  
In 1971 the European Community implemented its first GSP scheme in the 
framework of 10-year programs through different regulations for industrialized, tex-
tile products and agricultural products and also those covered by the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty. In 1979 was adopted the “Enabling Clause”, 
which both created the legal framework for the GSP and authorized developed coun-
tries to establish individual GSP schemes. 
Generally, the GSP is regarded as an autonomous trade arrangement through 
which the EU provides unilateral preferential access to the EU internal market to de-
veloping countries. The general arrangements cover both non-sensitive and sensitive 
products. Their sensitivity is determined by the situation of the sector producing the 
same products in the EU. Sensitive products require a higher border protection, while 
for non-sensitive goods tariffs could be reduced or eliminated. In other words, non-
sensitive products have duty free access to the EU internal market, while sensitive 
products could enjoy a tariff reduction. The EU GSP scheme has been revised several 
times in order to reflect evolutions in international trade and development. The latest 
revision was applied from 2014. The new scheme focuses 90 countries (beneficiaries) 
in order to ensure more impact on countries most in need.  
There are three main variants of this Scheme: 
the standard (general) GSP arrangement, offering generous tariff reductions to 
developing countries. This means partial or entire elimination of tariffs on two thirds 
of all product categories. 
 the “GSP+” enhance preferences mean full removal of tariffs on essentially the 
same product categories as those covered by the general arrangement. This arrange-
ment is granted to countries both ratified and implemented main international con-
ventions relating to human and labour rights, environment and good governance; 
"Everything but Arms" (EBA) arrangement for least developed countries (here-
after LDCs), granting both duty-free and quota-free access to all products, except for 
arms and ammunitions. 
According to EU regulations, the main key objectives for the GSP reform are the 
following: to concentrate GSP preferences on developing countries most in need, to 
reinforce the trade incentives in order to respect main human and labour rights, envi-
ronmental and good governance standards by implementation of 
the GSP+ arrangement, to strengthen the effectiveness of the trade concessions for 
LDCs, and to increase predictability, transparency and stability of the GSP. At the 
same time, a number of countries, which do not require GSP preferences in order to 
be competitive on the EU markets, no longer benefit from the GSP, notably, countries 
that have another preferential access to the EU (for example, under a Free Trade 
Agreement or a special autonomous trade regime); countries, achieved a high or up-
per-middle income per capita; overseas countries and territories, which are either at-
tached to the EU or are linked to another developed country. Their exports enter into 
EU internal market with a normal tariff applicable to all other developed countries. 
Current GSP preference-granting countries (as of February 2015): Australia, Belarus, 
Canada, EU countries, Japan, Iceland, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, the Rus-
sian Federation, and Switzerland, Turkey, U.S. 
According to Wall and Jones, the GSP schemes were established based on an 
economic theory that preferential tariff rates in developed country are able to promote 
export-driven industry growth in developing countries. This, in turn, would help to 
GSP beneficiaries both to diversify their economies in order to promote sustainable 
development and to withdraw from dependence on trade in primary products and raw 
materials. Differences in tariff regulation and economic structures between developed 
and developing countries conditioned difficulties of creation of unified system of tar-
iff incentives. And the GSP was an attempt to build a system of individual national 
schemes based on common principles and purposes. As a result, the preference-
granting countries implemented various individual schemes of preferences under 
which tariffs on imports originating certain developing countries were reduced or 
eliminated.  
Grossman & Sykes in analyzing of economic effects of tariff preferences con-
sidered both small and large countries. When small country, which has no market 
power on the world markets, receives tariff preferences, its exporters can sell their 
output at higher price and remain competitive in the foreign market. This leads to ex-
 port growth. So, the tariff preferences under GSP schemes provide a “terms of trade” 
benefit to the exporting country, reflecting the trade creation. When tariff preferences 
are granted to a large country, having market power, this also raises the internal price 
in the preference-receiving country (Fig. 1), as for the small economy. 
 
Fig. 1. Impact of non-reciprocal tariff preferences on welfare both donor 
and beneficiary countries 
 
But in this case there is a significant impact of the export growth on the world 
price (𝑝∗). The total world supply to the preference-granting country expands, which 
means that the market price falls from 𝑝∗ to 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐺𝑆𝑃
∗ . The beneficiary country still 
enjoys by a terms of trade gain, but not as great as before. Welfare rises by the area 
bounded by the demand and supply curves and by the price lines 𝑝∗ (1 + 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑁)⁄  and 
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡−𝐺𝑆𝑃
∗ , where 𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑁 is an MFN ad valorem tariff rate. In this case, the export 
growth in the preference-receiving country reflects both trade creation, since tariff 
preferences reduce the internal price in the beneficiary country, expanding its con-
sumption and contracting its home production and trade diversion, since the fall in 
the world price leads to a terms of trade loss for other countries that export to the 
beneficiary country, imposing the negative externality on the exporting countries that 
do not enjoy GSP schemes. 
The analysis of existing schemes of granting unilateral tariff preferences allowed 
us to summarize them in the Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2. General sequence of steps needed to beneficiary country in order to 
obtain non-reciprocal tariff preferences 
 
Some possible conclusions derived from analysis above are the following. 
1. The granting of tariff preferences could serve to promote trade volume and 
export earnings in the beneficiary countries. 
2. Granting of tariff preferences faces both opportunity and compliance costs, 
which in practice diminish the benefits of GSP arrangements. 
3. The macroeconomic benefits from tariff preferences in the long-run will be 
further diminished (or even become negative) if they lead to over-investment in the 
sectors that are eligible for GSP schemes. Such arrangements could distort invest-
1. Country eligibility (determine if country is a beneficiary by cheking mandatory 
and/or discretionary criteria) 
2. Product eligibility (checking the product coverage) 
3. Depth of tariff cuts (identifying the correct GSP rate) 
4. Preferential margin (checking the possibility of obtaining additional preferences 
in the framework of GSP scheme) 
5. Origin criteria (both checking how and when a product could be considered as 
originating in a GSP beneficiary country and controling of origin and administration 
cooperation) 
6. Consignment conditions (checking if the modalities for the transport of goods 
from the beneficiary country to the donor country market fulfill the appropriate 
provisions and regulations). 
7. Necessary documents (e.g. invoice declarations for customs and tax authorities). 
 ment decisions, rather than encouraging investment where long-term growth oppor-
tunities are present. 
4. Preferential tariff arrangements may retard trade liberalization in preference-
receiving countries, since applying the GSP schemes could reduce the incentive that 
export industries in developing countries have to lobby for trade liberalization at 
home in order to obtain access for foreign markets. 
4. Ukraine and APTR with EU 
Let’s briefly investigate current situation with tariff regulation in Ukraine-EU 
commodity trade. 
Now Ukraine applies import duties (general, reduced and preferential) for prod-
ucts originating in EU.  
According to GSP provisions, Ukraine benefit from GSP for all products cov-
ered by the system except railway and tramway vehicles and products. Also Ukraine 
is eligible for the GSP+. If in the future it applies for and is granted GSP+ treatment, 
the above limitation will not apply. 
Starting from May 2014 EU provided Ukraine the autonomous trade preferences 
in view of the security, political and economic challenges faced by Ukraine, and in 
order to support country’s economy. Previously, EU governments applied import du-
ties according Council Regulation (EC) №1186/2009 at rates common for all third 
countries.  
Late in April 2014 EU provided Ukraine the APTR, involving the unilateral re-
duction or elimination of EU customs duties on goods originating in Ukraine: on 
April 16, 2014 the EU Council adopted an appropriate decision and on April 22, 2014 
an appropriate Regulation of European Parliament and of the Council was published 
in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
This Regulation provides that the appliance of the autonomous trade preferences 
will start from May 2014 and last until November 2014. Effective as of introduction 
of APTR, EU governments set import duties at the level of the first year after coming 
in force the Agreement of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (hereafter 
DCFTA) between Ukraine and EU.  
In the framework of tariff and non-tariff regulation this proposal concerned the 
following commodities. 
1. Industrial Products. Existing EU tariffs for industrial goods exported from 
Ukraine will be removed immediately for 94,7% of commodities. For the remaining 
handful of products (some chemical products, etc.) the tariffs will be reduced. 
2. Agricultural Products. For agricultural goods, the EU has taken important but 
more limited action to open up its market to Ukrainian agriculture in order to ensure 
the European agricultural sector is not harmed by this unilateral trade action. Notably, 
the EU will grant immediate and unlimited preferences to 82,2% of Ukraine's ex-
 ports. For the other products (cereals, pork, beef, poultry and a handful of additional 
products) a partial liberalization will be achieved by the granting of duty-free tariff 
rate quotas (TRQs), which limit the amount of certain goods able to benefit from the 
trade preference. 
3. Processed food products. The EU will grant immediate preferences to 83,4% 
of Ukraine's exports. The remaining 15,9% will be partially liberalized through 
TRQs. 
According to the Fitch’s estimations, the approval of favorable tariffs and quotas 
would support long-term growth of Ukrainian exports to EU. Almost all Fitch-rated 
Ukrainian agricultural companies have substantial export sales. Most of them are fo-
cused on exports to Middle East, Asia and CIS countries, but at the same time they 
see the European Union as an attractive market for further export growth and diversi-
fication. Notably, greater opportunities may arise in southern and eastern European 
countries that are easier to service from Ukraine. 
On September, 2014 the implementation of statements of Ukraine-EU Associa-
tion Agreement, related to the DCFTA was postponed to the beginning of 2016. At 
the same time the APTR was unilaterally extended to the December 31, 2015. This 
means that after January 1, 2016 the import duty rates applied by EU governments to 
products originating in Ukraine, remained unchanged. Ukrainian government, in re-
turn, will start the gradual reduction of import duties for goods originating in EU in 
order to allow domestic economic agents to adjust to the new competitive conditions. 
The transition period will be 3-10 years, for automotive industry – 15 years.  
In the period of APTR the EU leaves the possibility to use the conditions of GSP 
regime currently applied for Ukraine. This means that Ukrainian exporters could de-
cide by themselves whichever regime they could use in order to export to the EU 
market. 
5. Conclusion 
Preferential trade regimes (GSP, GSP+, APTR) are established in order to in-
crease reciprocal trade and to provide access to the internal markets of developed 
countries for commodities originating from developing countries by reducing or elim-
inating tariffs. 
The unilateral tariff reduction or elimination under these schemes could lead ei-
ther to trade creation or trade diversion, depending firstly form the presence of mar-
ket power of beneficiary country. Ukraine now has no market power on the world 
commodity markets, and current situation with implementing of APTR arrangement 
involve further econometrical and statistical analysis in order to estimate the impact 
of non-reciprocal reduction of tariffs by EU governments on Ukrainian export flows. 
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